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Transparency in Antitrust-Do What We Say
and Not What We Do: Some Reflections on
Professor Grimes's Quest
PETER C. CARSTENSENt
As a former Antitrust Division (the "Division") attorney
whose service pre-dated the Tunney Act, I can recall the
penchant for non-disclosure that governed our settlements
long ago. I have even claimed that we were forbidden to
give out the time of day if we had to refer to a Department
of Justice ("DOJ") clock because that information came from
a government source. In my role as an occasional officious
intermeddler in antitrust matters I have been struck by the
continuity of that culture. Antitrust Division attorneys are
usually willing to listen to what you have to say, but they
are very unwilling to give out even the time of day with
respect to their investigations. At the same time, both the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the DOJ are very
enthusiastic about "transparent" decision-making by
competition authorities in other countries. The message
appears to be: Do what we say, not what we do.
On the other hand, during my years at the Division
(1968 to 1973), I spent a modest but consistent part of my
time editing and writing bank merger review letters. Under
the bank merger act, the Division had to make public
comments on every bank merger regardless of the size of
the transaction providing a competitive impact analysis and
stating the Division's enforcement intentions.' My
experience in doing that public review process convinced me
that the Division and, by extension, the FTC could be much
more open about their views without undue burden.
Moreover, such openness would be very helpful both in
shaping specific decisions and in bringing about a dialogue
t Young-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.
1. See 12 U.S.C. §1828(c)(4) (requiring banking agencies to seek evaluation
from the Antitrust Division prior to deciding merits of mergers).
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with interested private parties that would inform the
enforcement process. Such transparency would also weaken
the insider monopoly on antitrust representation that
favors a select few District of Columbia ("D.C.") firms and
practioners who, as repeat players, acquire a depth of
knowledge about the theories, factual standards and
strategies of the enforcers.
Professor Grimes's article is an important contribution
to the discussion of transparency.2 He is kinder and gentler
with the agencies than he ought to have been. He credits
their claims of burden far too much, but his analysis of the
benefits of fuller and more consistent disclosure is very
much on point. On the other hand, he may have
understated one major cost of achieving transparency,
which is the increased incentive to use a "fix-it-first"
settlement strategy with its lack of information. Also, he is
not sufficiently critical of the quality of disclosure that is
being made currently. Finally, based on my own experience
of commenting on a proposed settlement, there are
potential problems in policing any enhanced disclosure
obligation, especially if there must be much reliance on
district court judges. I will elaborate a little on these five
points.
A. The Costs and Burdens of Disclosure Are Not Great
Professor Grimes credits the claims of significant
burden on antitrust law enforcers if they are asked to
provide disclosure with respect to more decisions and to
improve the quality of such disclosure. In addition, he
credits the assertion that there would be real issues about
confidentiality of information if there were greater
disclosure. While both of these claimed burdens exist as a
matter of theory, in reality the significance of the first with
respect to major investigations is greatly exaggerated and
the reality of confidentiality claims is largely (but perhaps
not entirely) bogus.
In any major investigation, whether of a merger or any
other significant antitrust matter, there is going to be a
wide and deep internal paper trail. The staff attorneys will
write up their interviews and depositions, they will prepare
2. See generally Warren S. Grimes, Transparency in Federal Antitrust
Enforcement, 51 BUFF. LAW REv. 937 (2003).
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analyses of issues, and, ultimately, they will draft
recommendations for action or inaction. They will often
provide opposing counsel with written statements of their
factual and legal analysis as they develop their own
understanding of the facts and related legal and economic
analyses. Their supervisors will review these memoranda
and recommendations and make their own recommendation
and so on up the line to the decision-maker (the Assistant
Attorney General in the case of the Antitrust Division or
the members of the Federal Trade Commission). If this
process is well done, the memoranda will contain a general
analysis of the facts and legal standards that are
applicable, supported by more specific references to
documents, interviews, and depositions.
Where this process results in litigation, there will be
substantial disclosure of the factual and legal premises on
both sides. However, when the investigation is closed or the
case is settled prior to any litigation, the only fully informed
parties are the government staff and the legal
representatives of the parties that were targets. Given that
the public has paid the salaries and expenses of the public
servants charged with the investigation and analysis, it is
not unreasonable for the public to expect to know the
results of those efforts beyond the bare conclusion.
Moreover, there is at best a very modest burden involved in
sifting out of the final memoranda those general statements
concerning the legal and factual analysis necessary to
explain the basis on which the decision rested. Indeed, if it
is known in advance that there must be disclosure of the
basis for decision, the drafting process can proceed even
more efficiently. The assertion of a cost of $75,0003 for each
public report is the kind of creative accounting that might
even embarrass an Enron executive.
If, as Messrs. Nannes and Pitofsky claim, the real
burden lies in having the top decision maker review each
report, then the solution is to make reports of closed
investigations a staff statement akin to the no-action letters
that the Securities and Exchange Commission staff issues
3. Id. at 950 n.22.
4. For an example of such a letter including a statement of the limited value
of such informal statements, see Cap Rock Energy Corp., 2003 WL 21831870 at
22-23 (S.E.C. No-Action Letter, May 27, 2003). For a description of the no action
letter process, see Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory
Interpretations of SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed
2003] 1003
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This preserves the deniability of the ultimate decision
maker ("I never said that") and more accurately reflects the
institutional reality that it is the staff that is not
enthusiastic about the potential case, given its analysis of
the available information in light of the current state of the
law and agency enforcement policy.
A second justification for keeping secret the basis for
decisions is that it will pose a serious problem for
confidentiality. The Hart-Scott-Rodino merger reporting
statute is said to promise sweeping confidentiality for all
information received in the process, although that claim is
in fact not based on any clear statutory language.5 No such
statutory constraint governs other investigations. The
stated rationales for the excessive concern for
confidentiality are, first, that the parties will not otherwise
provide information that is "sensitive" and, second, that
complainants will fear retribution if their identities are
disclosed. Obviously, the more willing the enforcers are to
pander to such concerns, the greater the expectations of
such treatment and more inclusive the material covered.
Indeed, as Professor Grimes has shown the European
Union ("EU") experience as well as that of the Federal
Communications Commission and Federal Engergy
Regulatory Commission demonstrate that the lack of
secrecy is not a deterrent to active participation by affected
parties. Certainly there is some internal corporate
information that deserves confidential treatment. Similarly,
it is probably helpful to preserve the anonymity of
complainants in so far as is reasonably possible. But just
how naive are targets about the likely attitude and role of
their customers or competitors?
Confidentiality is a greatly exaggerated concern in
contemporary business litigation. Having been involved in a
Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 929-65 (1998). See also 17 C.F.R. § 200.81
(requiring public access to no-action letters absent special confidentiality
considerations).
5. Section 7A(h) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(h), provides: "[N]o such
information or documentary material may be made public, except as may be
relevant to any administrative or judicial action or proceeding." (emphasis
added). With appropriate deference to the DOJ and FTC, this language hardly
mandates a refusal to provide information in connection with the resolution of
merger cases whether before or after formal litigation is initiated. Nor should it
preclude an informative statement following the initiation of a second request
or the resolution of a matter under the "fix it first" approach of the DOJ. Such
proceedings are at least informal administrative actions.
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couple of matters where I was privy to what the parties
claimed as "confidential" business information, I am
convinced that the vast majority of such claims have no real
validity with respect to any legitimate interest in
concealing genuinely sensitive, competitively significant
information. The information is old news, largely, if not
entirely, known to competitors in any event. The label is
used to keep the public, customers, legislators and the press
from discovering the dubious (if not outright false) claims
and exploitative goals of the targets. The ultimate irony in
my experience was getting a document under the Freedom
of Information Act for a research project that I was
conducting and finding that the government officer had
blocked out "confidential" market share information for the
companies involved. Not only was the information "old" (i.e.,
it related to market positions of companies several of which
were no longer in existence, and covered a period at least
five years in the past), but, because it was in fact public
information, I had the data already.
A further consideration is that in the context of many, if
not all, major investigations, there is a substantial written
exchange of ideas, theories and factual claims between the
government attorneys and counsel for the parties. These
exchanges often involve discussion of facts or ideas supplied
by third parties with an interest in the matter. The problem
is that these other interested parties are frozen out of the
discussion and have little opportunity for effective
participation. The claim of confidentiality obstructs the
process of gathering and evaluating information relevant to
good enforcement decision making. The current excessive
obeisance to confidentiality serves neither the public's
interest in knowing about law enforcement nor the law
enforcers' interest in being well informed.
Indeed, as Professor Grimes describes in some detail,
the FTC has done a better job of disclosing its decisions
without any serious problem of confidentiality even under
current standards.6 Even more interestingly, the Division
6. See Grimes, supra note 2, at 964-68 n.70-75. As examples, see Statement
of the Federal Trade Commission Concerning Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd./P
& 0 Princess Cruises PLC and Carnival Corp/P & 0 Princess Cruises PLC,
F.T.C. File No. 021 0041 (Oct. 4, 2002) available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2002/10/cruisestatment.htm; Statement of Commissioners Sheila F. Anthony,
Orson Swindle, and Thomas B. Leary, Concerning Western States Gasoline
2003] 1005
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has demonstrated that my experience in bank merger
evaluation is not an artifact of that specific field. In the case
of the Hawaiian airline merger, the Division was quite
capable of filing a statement with the Department of
Transportation that provided a fully adequate discussion of
the competitive issues presented in that case without, in
the Division's own view, trespassing on obligations of
confidentiality.7
The bottom line is that the costs, either in an economic
sense or the broader and more relevant sense of increasing
the difficulty for investigation and access to information,
are easily exaggerated. Professor Grimes, in his effort to be
even handed, has, as a result, credited these claims far
more than they deserve.
B. The Benefits Are Substantial
Professor Grimes has ably set forth the key arguments
for fuller disclosure. No general elaboration is necessary.
Two aspects deserve particular highlighting in the context
of a national enforcement program. The current semi-secret
process creates a local monopoly in the D.C. bar and a few
select practitioners with respect to mergers and other
investigations. Repeat players get a substantial
informational advantage over the lawyer, knowledgeable
about antitrust, whose practice does not focus extensively
on representing clients before the enforcement agencies.
The creation of such barriers to entry into this aspect of the
practice is an unfortunate and easily avoided consequence
of excessive secrecy. Fuller disclosure of the reasoning and
consideration underlying decisions to enforce (and settle)
matters, as well as determinations not to proceed after
investigation, would ensure that attorneys outside those
representing the parties would have a much better
understanding of the focus of antitrust concern. This in
turn would improve the ability of lawyers to counsel clients
either to avoid problems or to identify the kinds of
information and analysis that would be relevant to
Pricing Investigation, F.T.C. File No. 981 0187 (May 2001) available at
http://www.ftc. gov/os/2001/05/wsgpiswindle.htm.
7. See Public Comments of the Department of Justice, Joint Application of
Aloha Airlines, Inc. and Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., No. OST-2002-13002 (D.O.T.




government decision makers if the client wanted to oppose
a particular matter.
Transparency also creates a more open and accessible
"two way street." Full disclosure makes it easier for those
outside D.C. to comment usefully in earlier stages of
investigations. Here, I refer to Professor Grimes's
suggestion that there ought to be more disclosure of
pending investigations once they have advanced to a stage
of serious attention. Combined with fuller disclosure of the
analysis underlying prior, comparable matters, this
information will allow third parties to make much more
focused and informative comments. In my limited
experience, government lawyers in D.C., especially those
dealing with some agricultural issues, are not fully
informed about all the potential impacts of particular
conduct or transactions. While they will listen to
suggestions, the investigation process does not encourage or
stimulate third party participation. Moreover, because of
the current emphasis on confidentiality, government
lawyers are not forthcoming about their own ideas nor do
they promote productive dialogue about the underlying
competitive issues. This makes it hard to engage in an
informed discussion and to identify the kinds of information
that might be relevant in proving (or disproving) a
particular claim.
In addition, and of paramount consideration, fuller
disclosure of the basis for decisions, after they are made,
will allow critics to identify the premises which they might
dispute in future cases. This is a very important function
for disclosure. If the government has assumed that two
products do not compete and so allowed a merger, informed
customers can work to educate the government so that in
the future similar transactions will be viewed more
critically. To be sure, the government would have to
abandon its prior position, but assuming its prior position
was wrong, it ought to abandon it. The problem is bringing
about change when the basis for a decision is not revealed.
Lastly, there is always suspicion of government. In
particular, those of us with a preference for a more active
antitrust enforcement policy are concerned that the issues
we perceive have not been considered. Full disclosure of the
basis for actions and inactions provides a way to create
increased credibility with such skeptics. This is not a claim
that our views will be embraced as the basis for action, but
2003] 1007
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rather, fuller disclosure will show that our concerns were
taken seriously and rejected for stateable and stated
reasons. The recent FTC settlement of the WalMart
acquisition of the leading grocery chain in Puerto Rico is an
example.8 Here the FTC in several statements discussed the
concern that WalMart would have monopsony power in the
market for fresh food products produced in Puerto Rico. The
FTC established its credibility by acknowledging the
concern, explaining its policy with respect to monopsony
(which is very conservative) and so explained its rejection of
such concerns as a basis for action. While I disagree with
the standard the FTC implies in its statement, I take
comfort in the fact that it acknowledged the competitive
issues. Moreover, those with comparable concerns now are
better informed as to the kinds of factual and economic
impact analysis that will be necessary to convince that
agency.
C. The Problem of "Fix it First" and Transparency
The Antitrust Division has since the 1980s followed a
policy of favoring "fix it first" resolutions to merger cases. In
its pure form, the parties' initial proposal identifies the
competitive problem and fixes it with a divestiture that
occurs simultaneously with the merger. In such a case, the
argument is that there is no violation because no
anticompetitive acquisition has occurred. Hence, the merger
is cleared without action. In theory, this is a faster and
more efficient solution to merger cases where there is a
partial but easily resolved anticompetitive overlap. The
FTC has taken a different position on such proposals and
requires the parties to enter into a consent decree.
In practice, "fix it first" has devolved into a pre-
litigation negotiation strategy in which the Division reviews
the initial "offer", conducts its investigation, indicates its
concerns, and the parties make another offer. This process
can go on for a number of rounds until either a deal is
struck or the Division sues. The Dean-Suiza merger is an
example where the process was visible. The parties initially
proposed a modest divestiture of overlapping dairies.9 The
8. See Grimes, supra note 2, at 985-87 nn. 100-02.
9. See Press Release, Suiza Foods Receives Second Request from Dept. of
Justice, (May 10, 2001) available at http://www.deanfoods.com/ir/press.html,
1008 [Vol. 51
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government apparently rejected that proposal as
inadequate although the reasons were never made public.
Probably, there was a concern with implications of the
relationship between Dairy Farmers of America (DFA) with
both the merged firm and the proposed acquiror of the
assets to be divested. DFA, the largest diary cooperative in
the country, was to have exclusive supply relationships
with both enterprises, which would have forced farmers to
join DFA in order to sell their milk. This would in turn
reduce the potential for alternative suppliers to compete for
the business of the merged firm. It would also exclude many
independent milk handlers from their existing business
with the merged firm. Finally, in some regions there
remained significant overlap between the Dean and Suiza
operations even after the proposed divestiture.
After apparently extensive negotiations, the merged
enterprise agreed to divest five more dairies and to limit
the application of the exclusive dealing agreement with
DFA to ensure more access to other producers to some (but
not all) of the dairies being acquired." All that is known
about the competitive analysis underlying this "settlement"
is the brief press release that the Division issued claiming
"victory" without any further explanation.
The proposed settlement with General Electric
concerning its acquisition of Honeywell demonstrates a
second type of problem. It appears that this settlement did
contemplate a consent decree.11 Because the European
Union vetoed the merger in its entirety, the DOJ never
completed the consent process and never filed a competitive
impact statement. Hence, there is no public record of the
markets that the Division examined or its analysis of them.
This makes it very difficult to analyze the debate between
the United States and the EU over the EU's successful
challenge to the merger. Despite various public statements
Suiza indicated that it would divest six fluid milk plants in five states to resolve
all antitrust problems.
10. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Justice Dept. Requires Suiza Foods and
Dean Foods to Divest 11 Dairy Processing Plants (Dec. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/December/01_at_652.htm (stating that Suiza
would divest 11 fluid milk plants in eight states and would limit the scope of the
D.F.A. exclusive dealing contract with respect to its acquired dairies).
11. See Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Justice Dept. Requires Divestitures




about the facts and their analysis, it is not clear whether
the disagreement between the Division and the EU arose
from different market analyses, from different perspectives
on the possible competitive effects of the merger, or because
the EU considered markets and market effects that the
Division had not evaluated.12
Increased transparency, where cases are filed or formal
investigations are undertaken, is likely to make it more
attractive to secretive government enforcers and private
parties to employ "fix it first" strategies. Unless the
transparency policy applies to such deals as well, the
incentive to have less well informed and even less well
documented settlements will be substantial. The difficulty
on the other side is that a genuine "fixed before submitted"
transaction really is one that warrants quick clearance
without substantial investigation. Moreover, it is hard to
distinguish such proposals from the substantial number of
mergers that involve no serious antitrust issues despite
their large size. Thus, the challenge for a new transparency
policy is to ensure that all "settlements" (i.e., matters where
the parties make changes in the transaction or business
practice after an initial submission or initiation of
investigation) are subject to a disclosure requirement.
D. The Quality of Existing Disclosure
Professor Grimes contends that there is already
minimally acceptable disclosure in a substantial percentage
of cases. I question his measure, which is a crude
quantitative statement based on cases for which some
statement was provided. The disclosures called for by the
Tunney Act seem to me to involve potentially frequent
failures to disclose essential information. Indeed, Professor
Grimes documents that in some of the cases he examines. A
central problem in achieving better disclosure is the failure
of federal district court judges to insist upon it as a
condition of approving settlements.
My modest contribution to this aspect of the discussion
is to reflect on my involvement in an effort to get the
Division to be more forthcoming with respect to its proposed
12. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on
Antitrust and Trade Regulation, Supplement to the 2002 Milton Handler
Antitrust Reviews Proceedings, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 451, 486-491 (2003).
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settlement of the Archer-Daniels Midland Co.'s ("ADM")
acquisition of Minnesota Corn Processors ("MCP").13 These
two firms are leading producers of high fructose corn syrup
("HFCS") and ethanol. The Division proposed a settlement
that allowed ADM to acquire MCP's facilities provided it
ended a joint marketing arrangement between MCP and
another major HFCS producer (something which ADM
would almost certainly have done in any event).
The initial competitive impact statement omitted
essential information. It did not reveal that ADM held a
15% voting interest in another major competitor in HFCS
that was by far the largest single holding in that company;
it failed to disclose MCP's share of HFCS capacity making it
impossible to tell how much concentration would change in
the relevant markets following this combination; and it did
not even mention that ADM and MCP were the first and
second largest producers of ethanol in the United States
having in combination between 30 and 40% of all productive
capacity. In addition, ADM acts as the exclusive marketing
agent for an unknown number of other plants under
apparently long term contracts, thus conferring even more
power in the market for distributing ethanol. Our
comments highlighted these factual omissions as well as
the failure to explain why, given the high barriers to entry
and the unresponsiveness of demand in the HFCS markets
to price change, this combination would not create
substantial anticompetitive risks even after breaking the
joint marketing venture.
In its response to these comments, the Division did
acknowledge ADM's substantial stock interest in a
competitor in the HFCS markets, but claimed, without
explanation, that the 15% voting interest would not keep
these firms from competing. On its face, this is a profoundly
naive assertion, as anyone versed in corporate law and
economics would know. Of course, there might be good
reason for such a claim based on contractual or other
13. See United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Civ. No. 02-1768, 2003
WL 21976063 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2002) (mem.). The competitive impact statement,
the comments, and the reply from the DOJ can be found at the Antitrust
Division Web site at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/casses/index358.htm. The letter to
Judge Bates of April 17, 2003, see Grimes, supra note 2, 984 n.97, replying to




constraints on ADM's power, but such a non-obvious
explanation needs to be set forth.
The Division also reluctantly disclosed that the level of
concentration in the HFCS markets would increase by 100
to 300 points to levels that its own guidelines suggest create
a presumption of anticompetitive effect. But the
government's reply declared that the guideline presumption
was weak. Instead, the reply asserted that competition was
assured because there is "excess capacity throughout the
corn wet milling industry" and that makes collusive pricing
impossible.14 But in a contemporaneous court opinion
examining these same HFCS markets, Chief Judge Richard
Posner, no antitrust hawk, but a very perceptive analyst,
noted that "defendants [HFCS manufacturers] had a lot of
excess capacity, a condition that makes price competition
more than usually risky and collusion more than usually
attractive .... The defendants continued to add to their
capacity .... Maintenance of excess capacity discourages
new entry.., and also shores up a cartel by increasing the
risk that its collapse will lead to a devastating price
war.... "" Thus the same industrial fact, excess capacity,
in the same industry, has lead two observers to exactly
opposite conclusions. The difference is that Judge Posner
has explained the economic and factual basis for his
conclusion while the Antitrust Division only asserted a
conclusion.
I am not prepared to claim that the distribution of
excess capacity after ADM's acquisition of MCP can not
result in a workably competitive market. Judge Posner's
analysis focused on a period prior to the acquisition, and it
is possible that the excess capacity is in the hands of a firm
or firms with incentives inconsistent with collusion-tacit
or express-to raise prices. But it requires some careful and
potentially complex economic analysis to justify the
conclusion that such capacity will stimulate price competi-
tion and deter tacit collusion.
With respect to ethanol, publicly available facts indicate
that there were few barriers to entry into production of
14. Dept. of Justice, Response of the United States to Public Comments on
the Proposed Final Judgment, No. 1:02CV01768, at *9 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2OO9OO/2O0905.htm.




ethanol, but it also appeared that there may be more
substantial barriers to effective competition in marketing.
It appears probable that the Division investigated these
aspects of the merger and concluded, on some undisclosed
basis, that there were no substantial risks of
anticompetitive effect. It did not, however, explain the basis
for this conclusion to the court in its statement. Indeed,
until the comments raised the issue, the Division failed
even to acknowledge that ADM and MCP competed in the
ethanol markets.
In sum, the disclosure of both relevant factual
information and the legal-economic analysis that would
justify the resulting consent decree were not present. It
would be entirely inaccurate in this context to label the
disclosure by the government as even "minimally
acceptable." This is not to say that there might not be a
fully satisfactory rational for the government's settlement.
But the goal of the Tunney Act was to bring into the light of
day the basis for action and not merely the assertion of
conclusions.
E. The Problem of Improving Disclosure
Although it is hard to see how a judge could ratify the
proposed ADM decree intended to protect competition
without a better and more convincing explanation for the
government's optimism, the judge in this case did exactly
that.16 He copied, in large measure, the government's
declarations and failed to question its key unsupported
claims. He accepted the assertion that 15% voting interest
created no risks to competition" and that excess HFCS
capacity would induce price competition without any
further information about the basis for either claim. 8 The
failure of the opinion to get the first initial of my first name
correct and its erroneous assertion that the comments
focused primarily on ethanol provide further demonstration
of the superficial quality of this review. "
16. United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No. 02-1768, 2003 WL
21706543 (mem.) (D.D.C. July 22, 2003).
17. Id.
18. Id. (retaining five competitors, "the government's proposed remedy
directly addresses the dangers of increase anticompetitive coordination").
19. At page eight, Judge Bates makes his initial reference to our comment
as being one from "Professor C. Carstensen of the University of Wisconsin . .. "
2003] 1013
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To increase the incentives for the Antitrust Division to
provide more transparency, it is essential that the courts
insist on fuller disclosure. The unfortunate language of the
D.C. Circuit in the 1995 Microsoft consent decree case
haunts the process.2 ° If, indeed, a judge is only to consider
whether a settlement "makes a mockery" of the antitrust
laws, 1 then perhaps the judge can with impunity commit
the court to ratifying anything the government presents. A
decree, even if consented to, is an act of the court and so
necessarily involves judicial ratification of the deal. Self
respecting judges ought to be uncomfortable with
ratification based on the limited information that the
government currently provides.
It may be argued that most federal judges have scant
knowledge of antitrust in general and merger law in
particular. Hence, it is also possible to excuse excessive,
even slavish, reliance on the Antitrust Division's assertions
even when they contradict common sense. But if that is so,
then it raises a fundamental concern for implementing
reform with respect to transparency: who can police the
quality of disclosure? The Tunney Act does provide that a
judge may name a special master or request the "views,
evaluations, or advice of any individual..." to assist in
reviewing the proposed settlement.2 Judges, who lack
experience in the field, when confronted with plausible
claims that the competitive impact statement is incomplete
or inadequate, could invoke this provision to seek expert
advice. There are a number of academics in both law and
economics who are both experienced and highly capable of
Id. At page twelve, he claims that the comment's "most fervent challenge to the
proposed Final Judgment" related to "the ethanol market." Id. In fact, of the 15
pages of the comment, less than five addressed the ethanol market and those
comments acknowledged that there appeared to be no basis to challenge the
merger in the market for ethanol production, but suggested the need for greater
information about ethanol distribution because of the greater possibility that
entry into that aspect of the business might be constrained. See Public
Comments of Peter C. Carstensen, Proposed Settlement of United States v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No. 02-1768, 8-14 (D.D.C. Dec. 27, 2002), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2009O0/200905a.pdf. Only a very casual
reader would think that this commentary on the ethanol issues was "fervent"
especially in comparison to the very serious prima facie competitive issues
raised by this merger in the HFCS markets. See id. at 4-8.
20. See United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
21. Id. at 1462.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 16(f)(2).
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making such reviews. To date, no judge has used this
mechanism, but it is one way for judges to get a better
understanding of whether there are serious deficiencies in
disclosures made by the government. Such review does not
require the judge to reject the proposed decree eventhough
the judge might well demand fuller disclosure before
consenting. Use of such an expert review mechanism could
also create effective pressure on the government to be more
forthcoming in its disclosures.
Beyond the problem of enhancing standards of review,
the key issues, as Professor Grimes, states are in finding
the right ways to communicate information at the lowest
practical cost and simplify the process within reason. I
largely agree with his suggestions.
CONCLUSION
The greatest obstacle to improving transparency is the
culture of the enforcers. The FTC has always been
somewhat more open because of the ability of individual
commissioners to dissent from decisions either to act or not
to act. Moreover, I have been impressed with the
willingness of its current leadership to continue to develop
fuller transparency about both settlements and at least key
decisions not to challenge mergers or other practices. The
Antitrust Division culture, however, still wants to keep the
time on Division clocks secret. A real commitment to
openness by the leadership of that agency could bring about
the kind of change that is essential. Regrettably, only
pressure from the courts or congress is likely to cause such
a change, and then only with the greatest reluctance.
Professor Grimes is to be commended for bringing this
issue to the table in his forceful article. He is kinder and
gentler than he needs to be in his review, but his essential
point stands out nevertheless: the public interest demands
more, much more, transparency in antitrust enforcement.
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